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R. JUSTICE STONE'S opinion in the Apex case' has not been
very instructive. He has made it dear that the Sherman Act
was designed to prevent restraints on free competition in national markets, and was not devised to set the federal courts up as policing
agencies to prevent those interferences with interstate transportation
which local authorities should punish. But he does not say precisely what
he means by protection of competition in interstate markets from the restraining activities of labor unions. His attempt to interpret and to reconcile earlier labor decisions of the Court under the Sherman Act, to correlate these with the business decisions and thereby to explain the Court's
position in the Apex case is confusing. But lawyers are anxious to understand the Court's attitude toward labor union activities under the act;
and this speculation is an endeavor to determine what that position
may be.
I

We know that a strike which stops production and by this circumstance
alone prevents continued shipment of goods into interstate commerce is
not, without more, a violation of the act, no matter how illegal the strikers' technique may be.2 And this is now true even if the strikers, in addition to stopping production by stopping work, deliberately prevent the
employer under strike from shipping finished goods ready for shipment
and designed for interstate markets, as long as it appears that they were
doing this only to embarrass him and thereby more effectively to coerce
him into granting their demands. 3 Furthermore, the fact that the unionists
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
xApex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3io U.S. 469 (I94O). Although this case is commonly spoken
of as involvinga strike or sitdown strike, it appeared that onlya handful of the "strikers" had
actually been employed at the Apex plant. The occurrence might more accurately be characterized as a variation of "stranger picketing" in which a mob of outsiders connected with the
federated union came in and violently took possession of the plant, causing considerable destructidn of property.
2United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (First Coronado case), 259 U.S. 344 (1922);
United Leather Workers' Int'l Union v. Herkert & MeiselTrunk Co. (Leather Workers' case),
265 U.S. 457 (1924).
3Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 31o U.S. 469 (I94O). As will subsequently appear, the Second
Coronado case might also be cited in support of this proposition. Note 5infra and accompanying text.
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are not even strikers, but are outsiders moving in on a plant which they
seize in order to achieve their designs, does not affect the outcome in the
instances just related. 4 But if it appears that the unionists in these cases
intended by the strike or seizure to keep the producer's non-union-made
goods from entering national markets in order to prevent them from competing with the union-made goods of already unionized producers, a restraint on free competition in an interstate market is said to have occurred
in violation of the Sherman Act.5
This was at one time thought to be true even if the intent was not
presently to keep out non-union-made goods by striking to prevent continued production or by seizure or other physical interference to prevent
shipment of already existing non-union goods, but rather to insure that
the future output of the producer would be only union goods byforcing him
to unionize and not by interfering with the transportation or the manufacture for. transportation of any sort of goods at all.6 Under this last conception, the ultimate aim to keep non-union goods from competing with
union made goods in national markets was apparently the offense. Now,
however, we have recent authority, also dictum but undoubtedly trustworthy, that such an aim as part of an organizational strike or seizure of
a plant, no matter how dearly proved the intent may be to obviate nonunion competition by unionization, is not an offense under the Sherman
Act, but is only a normal union objective which we must accept as an
7
inseparable feature of modem labor unionism itself.
The legal profession has, no doubt, always regarded the Brims case8
as the most obvious instance of organized labor's violation of the Sherman
Act. In that case the union permitted itself to be used by two business
combinations as the means of effecting the exclusion from the Chicago
market of any wood trim made by out-of-city or -state non-union mills.
This, of course, was the creation and maintenance of a monopoly for the
benefit of unionized Chicago woodworking mills. But most lawyers have
always thought, at least until the Apex decision, that union organizational
boycotts which prevented shipments and sales of designated products in
interstate commerce were equally offensive under the act. The three
4 Note i supra.
s Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (Second Coronado case), 268 U.S.

295 (1925).

6 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (First Coronado case), 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
7 Compare the remarks of Stone, J., in the Apex case, 310 U.S. 469, 5o3-4 (194o), quoted
in the text infra pp. 242-43.

8 United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
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precedents were the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford cases. 9 In each a union
created pressure on the buyers of a commodity in states other than that
of production, effectively discouraging purchases and thus destroying the
producer's interstate business. That the pressure was created in different
ways in each of these cases seems unimportant; in each it was a peaceful
secondary pressure based on a refusal to deal except upon stated terms.
On the face of it, and certainly before April, i94o, most lawyers would
have supposed that a restraint, the very purpose of which was to destroy
a producer's interstate sales, was an offense under the Sherman Act.
Certainly they would if they had looked at it from the potential buyer's
viewpoint. A contractor in the Bedford case whose employees threatened
to strike if he continued to purchase and use out-of-state non-union-cut
Bedford stone would certainly have a hard time understanding that he
and other contractors similarly situated had not been deprived of access
to an unrestricted interstate market. Their lawyers would have a hard
time understanding just what Congress had in mind if the Sherman Act
was not to prevent the occurrence of this sort of thing; for if the shipment
of stone from Indiana to contractors in other states was not interstate
commerce, and if conduct expressly designed to destroy orders, sales and
shipments constituting such commerce was not a restraint on interstate
commerce, then what would be?
There is little doubt that the Supreme Court's reaction in those cases
coincided with the feelings of the contractors and their lawyers; it recognized a violation of the act, basing its decisions on the fact that the unions
involved had created sanctions attempting to destroy continued commerce
in the commodities of specified producers. In those cases the Court did
not talk about the amounts of the commodities affected; nor did it talk
about restraints on the general market for such commodities, substantial
or other. Nothing was said about a general restriction of free competition leading to a market control affecting price or supply. Although any
treatment of those cases dearly indicated a control which discriminated
between the would-be purchasers and sellers of the commodities, such
control did not appear to be for the purposes of rigging the market, as
such, in any way, but simply to embarrass the producers into recognizing
the union.
A year ago lawyers reading the previous three sentences would have
asked: "Why should the Court have mentioned or stressed these factors
9Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury Hatters' case), 208 U.S. 274 (I908); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters'

Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37

(1927).
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in its boycott opinions? Since the Sherman Act specifically applies to all
restraints and says nothing about market controls, the control of prices or
supplies, or discrimination as between would-be purchasers or sellers, why
do you mention such things?" I would not have and did not mention
them a year ago in an analysis I then wrote of the Sherman Act and its
applications to union boycott activities. ° But Justice Stone said in the
Apex case that these factors must be considered in all labor cases arising
under the Sherman Act, albeit they were not stressed in the three leading
boycott cases. He added, however, that they need not play a prominent
part in determining whether or not the act has been violated if the "necessary effect" of the activity in question is a "substantial" restraint on the
general market for the commodities affected. Such a "substantial" restraint, he remarked, was observable in each of the three boycott cases
under discussion.- Unfortunately, a careful reading of the reports indicates that the Court did not treat this as a necessary factor in its decisions
of those cases.'
Perhaps justice Stone would have done better in the Apex case to have
emphasized as the ratio decidendi of the three boycott cases the fact that
the union activity resulted in discrimination as between would-be purchasers and sellers, thereby having on his side as a matter of record at
least part of the Leather Workers' case dictum which he featured in his
opinion.' 3 This item in the dictum undoubtedly had reference to the boycott situations in the Loewe and Duplex cases, the Bedford case not yet
having been decided at that time. His reluctance to rely heavily on this
10Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case, 7 Univ.
Chi.L. Rev. 347 (1940).
"XApex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 5o6 (i94o). Mr. Justice Stone states: "It
will be observed that in each of these cases [Loewe, Duplex, Bedford and Second Coronado]
where the Act was held applicable to labor unions, the activities affecting interstate commerce
were directed at control of the market and were so widespread as substantially to affect it."
It might be observed that he also read considerable into these cases which seems absent from
them when he said that the activities "were directed at control of the market."
2Although it is apparent in the Loewe case that the Court could not have found evidence
to support the conclusion that the fur hat market had been affected by the boycott,
it did appear in the Duplex case that the complainant's factory was one of only four such
plants feeding national markets; and in the Bedford case there were allegations indicating
that the stone setters' boycott affected more than twenty quarries shipping about ten million
dollars worth of cut stone annually into out-of-state markets.
X3265 U.S. 457, 476 (1924). This dictum reads as follows: "It is only when the intent or
necessary effect upon such commerce in the article is to enable those preventing the manufacture to monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate as between its would-be
purchasers, that the unlawful interference for its manufacture can be said directly to burden
interstate commerce."
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dictum was natural, however, in view of the result in the Apex case which
he was attempting to rationalize. For he might have found it rather difficult to explain satisfactorily that whereas the boycotts, by preventing the
continued orders and sales (as well as shipments), obviously discriminated
as between would-be purchasers and sellers, the refusal of the "strikers"
in the Apex case to let the producer send out to the trade a million and a
half pairs of finished stockings was not such a discrimination. And while
the subject of inconsistencies is up, it might be well to point out that
Justice Stone would have found it quite as difficult to satisfy the profession
that, whereas the effect of the three boycotts was substantially to restrain
the general market for fur hats, printing presses and cut stone, the effect
of the Apex "strike" and its incidental activities was not substantially to
restrain the general market for silk stockings.
II
With the boycott cases before us, it would be a pity not to discuss them
in light of the often-cited Second Coronado case.' 4 The relation is not obvious, because the types of conduct involved seem different, the Coronado
case being merely a strike for the dosed shop and not a blow "directly at"
interstate commerce. The effect of.keeping Coronado coal from being
shipped, however, was probably much the same on the general coal market
as the effect of keeping Apex stockings from being shipped was on the
general hosiery market. For that matter, these two effects on the coal
and stocking markets, respectively, were no doubt much the same as the
effects of the hat, press and stone boycotts. At least we have no reason
(as a matter of record) to assume the contrary. Yet the Court in the First
Coronado case 5 suggested, and in the Second Coronadocase accepted, proof
of actual or subjective intent on the part of the strikers to keep Coronado
coal out of a national market for the purpose of preventing it (non-unionmined coal) from competing in that market with union-mined (highercost) coal of other operators as tantamount to a violation of the Sherman Act.
At the same time it has never stipulated such proof of intent to affect
competition in a national market as a prerequisite to recognizing a violation of the act in the boycott cases. Why not? The answer made by those
who like the result in the boycott cases is that the union boycotts obviously
strike at, or deal with, interstate commerce. Unions achieved organizaNote 5 supra and accompanying text. The boycott cases referred to are, of course, the
Loewe, Duplex and Bedford cases.
1S 259 U.S. 344, 408-9 (1922).
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tional objectives through destroying interstate commerce in such a way
that destruction of the commerce became their primary aim; whereas this
is not so in the strike cases. Thus, the explanation goes, there is a vast
difference between a mere strike that interferes with interstate commerce
by stopping production and a boycott that by secondary pressure prevents
would-be purchasers from buying and, hence, would-be sellers from selling
in interstate commerce. I absolutely agree; but then I ask if the difference
is just as vast when it appears that the strikers not only interfere with
commerce by passively stopping production through cessation of work,
but also deliberately prevent the shipment of completed goods intended
for out-of-state markets, such prevention being purely a coercive pressure
on the producer and not designed as a market control or interference with
competition of any sort in any way. The answer to this question is, of
course, not dear; certainly the producer and his customers in the latter
case might have difficulty in appreciating the difference. Of course, it can
be said by the still-skeptical supporters of the Court's precedents that in
the boycott cases the would-be purchasers are prevented from selling, so
that ordering and solicitation of orders has now become futile. The object
of their reply is, apparently, that while a strike or seizure, even where it
prevents shipment of already produced goods, is a coercion only on one
person, the boycott in its ordinary form involves another person and hence
interferes with commercial relations, becoming virtually a "restraint of
trade.'l x6 My only answer is that if they think this proves anything, how
much good do they think it would have done the customers of Coronado
or Apex to submit orders or to press for delivery on placed orders or for
the two producers in question to have solicited orders during the periods
their businesses were in control of the unions?
The idea I mean to convey in the previous paragraph appears briefly in
the following sentences: The conduct of strikers, or of those who seize a
plant, for the purpose of preventing its output from entering a national
market, as distinguished from the purpose of merely preventing operation
x6They do not distinguish between the boycott as it actually arose in the Bedford case, and
the converse of that situation. Suppose that the employees of the Bedford Cut Stone Co. in
Indiana were already unionized, and that the union was interested in organizing the non-union
stone setters of certain general contractors in Colorado. If they refused to work at the unionized quarry on stone destined for the non-union general contractor in Colorado, it is said that
such a case is no different from the Bedford case as it actually arose. But it is not so easy
under such circumstances to see how the purchase by an out-of-state third party has been
much more drastically affected than it would have been in a situation like the Apex case where
the "strikers" refuse to allow already produced goods to be shipped. Each is an instance of
organizational coercion, the only defensible difference being that between forbidding a sale
and forbidding the consummation of a sale.
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in order to embarrass the owner into compliance with a union demand,
may not be an interference with a "market" in any sense of that term.
Personally I don't believe it is. But I think it is just as much an interference with a "market" as a boycott is, be it a labor or a consumption
boycott. Hence, my conclusion is that neither a strike, with or without
deliberate forcible prevention of shipments, nor a boycott, so long as the
one or the other is aimed merely at achieving some legitimate union end
such as wages and hours or organization, occasions a violation of the
Sherman Act in the sense indicated by Mr. Justice Stone.
III
The trump card of the still-skeptical lawyer at this point is probably
that the Second Coronado case is bad, anyway-that it never should have
been decided and that it introduced an element of confusion into the administration of the Sherman Act by making liability contingent on the
proof.of actual or subjective intent on the part of the strikers to restrain
competition in a national market. But advancement of this argument has
adroitly removed the arguer from the former role of supporting the Court's
earlier decisions to that of supporting only the boycott decisions. Now,
however much one may sympathize with this position, Supreme Court
precedents cannot be lightly disregarded merely because they do not fit
into a nice scheme. Instead of just calling the case "wrong," one should
try to understand its place in a subtly-woven fabric of policy, particularly
in view of the Court's complete re-affirmation of the Second Coronado
case in the Apex decision itself. This factor is not thrown out by one who
really wishes to find out where the Court is heading; for it may be an
extremely important clue in the determination of an ultimate judicial
position to be assumed by a group of Justices who themselves are not
exactly sure of their destination.
Why did the Court take the position it assumed in the Coronado cases?
The answer can only be guessed; but inquiry may go far toward narrowing
the area of speculation. The Court was dealing with a statute that was
vague enough to have justified its discard as unconstitutional for that
reason. The Court chose, however, to try to make some sense out of it.
Unimpressed by the few state court decisions in i9o8 recognizing the
legality of labor and other boycotts and having no independent love of
such activities, the Court did not hesitate to treat the boycott in the Danbury Hatters' case as an illegal restraint on interstate commerce as soon
as it was satisfied that Congress had intended to apply the Sherman Act
to labor combinations. The restraint was obvious and boycotts-especial-

THE SHERMAN ACT v. LABOR
ly organizational labor boycotts-were unpopular. Contemporary decisions indicate that the Court did not like the spread of federated union
organization-itself a threat to national markets through monopoly of
labor and stabilization of production costs at a high level-although apparently little thought was given to the matter, probably because more
seemed unnecessary. It now seems cldear that the Court furthermore believed to be identical any interference with interstate commerce (i) as an
act sufficient to justify the exercise of federal power or assumption of
jurisdiction, and (2) as an act unlawful according to the terms of the statute in question. Nothing in the next labor decision-the Duplex caseaffected this position; the only new feature of that action was the disposal
7
of Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Court had to deal with the Coronado
case. For the first time it probably perceived a glimmering distinction
between such an interference with interstate commerce as warranted the
assumption of federal jurisdiction to regulate and such an interference as
constituted an illegal restraint under the Sherman Act. Nothing had happened which would lead one to believe that Chief justice Taft's court was
any more favorably disposed toward widespread federated union organization than was Chief justice Fuller's. Congress had double-crossed the
unions in 1914 and the Court had helped to make this apparent in 1921. x8
Failure of the great steel strike at the opening of the twenties and public
opinion at that time give some indication that the unions were not very
strong politically. Yet the Court could not declare a strike, as such, even
at a plant engaged in production for national markets, to be a violation
of the Sherman Act merely because it kept goods out of interstate commerce through enforced cessation of operations. If it did so in this case,
even if it were a strike for the closed union shop, it would have to do it
with all strikes having a similar effect on commerce-including those for
wages and hours-unless it arbitrarily held that organizational strikes
were bad as its reason for doing otherwise. But such frankness was impolitic even as far back as twenty years ago.
'7 38 Stat. 730 (1914), i5 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1927). The Clayton Act, hailed by Samuel Gompers as labor's Magna Charta, proved to be a boomerang. Note i8 infra; see also Sharp and
Gregory, Social Change and Labor Law 124-25 (1939).
is No attempt is made here to discuss whether or not Congress intended the Sherman Act to
apply to situations involving labor. See the early chapters of Berman, Labor and the Sherman
Act (930); Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, 39 Col. L. Rev. 1283 (I939)
and 40 Col. L. Rev. 14 (i94o); Shulman, Labor and the Anti-trust Laws, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 769
(i94o). To quell union demands, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914. In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), the Court held that Sections 6 and 2o of the
Clayton Act merely re-enacted the common law as everyone understood it to be.
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At the same time the Court realized that if it could find a purpose or aim
on the part of the strikers to restrain interstate commerce, particularly of a
sort which would not be likely to occur in relatively desirable strikes for
wages and hours, no "jurisdictional incident" would be necessary to recognize a violation under the act. As a clue to the finding of such a purpose
or aim, the Court suggested proof that the strike was intended to unionize
the Coronado mine in order thereby to keep non-union-mined coal from
entering a national market and from competing therein with union-mined
coal. 9 For it was a matter of common knowledge that the United Mine
Workers had to protect organized mines from non-union competition or
lose the principal advantages it had gained in unionized mines. And no
matter how much it may offend union partisans, this idea of the Court's to
protect national markets from the wholesale restraint which universal
unionism threatened to impose by eliminating from national trade such
an important competitive factor as free non-union enterprise cannot be
lightly dismissed. In the early twenties people were by no means convinced as they seem to be today that labor unionism was going to become
universally organized in federated systems which could stabilize such an
important cost item as wages throughout industry. Nor did they believe
that union control over an important competitive factor in national markets was necessarily an inseparable feature of unionism itself as the present Supreme Court apparently thinks it is. If the Court had been taxed
with this argument twenty years ago, its reply would have undoubtedly
been: "Then so much the worse for labor unionism!" At any rate, I believe the Court knew what it wanted and I shall try to show how it went
about achieving its objective.
For a different purpose the Court had already held that the mining was
a local affair; 20 and that would relieve the Court from having to hold illegal
the prevention of continued interstate commerce incidentally occurring as
a consequence of the stoppage of production caused by the mere cessation
from work. Therefore, it would not have to hold that the union had violated the act unless theplaintiff could virtually prove a "conspiracy" to
restrain competition in a national market. And if this "conspiracy" were
proved, no actual physical restraint would be necessary to establish a violation?- But this idea of the Court's in the First Coronado case has never
become more than mere dictum. The coal company's counsel found eviX9
Compare note
20

x3 supra.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1g8).

2z Compare the extended discussion of Douglas, J., in note 59 to his opinion in the SoconyVacuum case. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.

150, 224

n. 59 (1940).
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dence of intent to do something more than ultimately affect the nature
of competition in the national market by unionizing the Coronado mines;
evidence was presented indicating that the unionists intended by the
strike to keep all Coronado coal presently out of the market, not merely
as a means of embarrassing the mine owner into unionizing, but to keep
his output from entering national markets at all, so that it would not compete with union-mined coal until union terms were met.2 This evidence
that the union, by its strike and its destruction of coal cars and tipples,
was not just trying to stop operations for organizational purposes, but
was also trying to keep coal out of the market, must have made the Court
feel that the situation was not much different from the boycott casesentirely aside from the subjective intent of the unionists to prevent competition by non-union coal with union-mined coal. The difference was essentially a difference between a situation where strikers sit on a supply of
already-manufactured goods and say: "You can't ship these until you
organize"; and a situation where an employee in another state says to his
employer (a would-be purchaser): "If you buy and propose to use a shipment of goods from producer X, I and my fellow unionists won't work
for you." The practical result in either case is the same, aside from the
proof of subjective intent to affect a general market. The only difficulty in
thus comparing the strike and boycott cases is that in the former the practical effect of interference with commerce which inevitably accompanies
any effective strike in a plant producing for national markets may easily
be mistaken for a deliberate keeping of goods out of interstate commerce
by application of the legal rule that one is presumed to intend the consequences of acts deliberately performed.23 Therefore it would be desirable
in all strike or seizure cases, before a violation could be shown (if, indeed,
one ever can be shown hereafter), to require either proof of subjective intent that the unionists are holding up operations in order to keep products
out of interstate markets, or objective proof that the unionists will not
allow completed goods to enter interstate markets. The first alternative
requires proof almost impossible to furnish unless counsel is lucky enough
to find a traitor among the union leaders; and the second tequires proof
substantially of the sort offered by plaintiff's counsel in the Apex case and
thought insufficient by the Court.
" This evidence is related in the report of the Second Coronado case, 268 U.S. 295, 302
and its effect is summed up and interpreted by the Court on page 310.
23The Court made it amply clear in its opinions in the First and Second Coronado cases,
and in the Leather Workers' case, that it did not infer the intent deliberately to keep goods out
of interstate commerce by application of this rule.
(r925),
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In criticism of what I have just said, however, it might be argued that
I have made it appear that while a strike among production employees
cannot occasion a violation of the Sherman Act through interfering with
commerce by stopping production, a strike among the shipping employees
would inevitably have this effect. But this is not what I have said. Rather, I have meant to indicate that any interference by anyone, employees
or outsiders, with either production or shipment, intended to eliminate
the plant in question as a unit contributing, in any way, its products
to national markets, is different from an interference by the same group
with continued production designed merely to force the producer into
complying with a union's demands. This is, of course, a thin distinction,
and I am not enthusiastic in its support. At the same time I think it quite
necessary, for reasons already stated, that it should be made as long as
there is any likelihood that the Court will continue to lend full force to
the boycott cases after having established its position in the Apex case.
IV
From the foregoing it may be supposed that I think the Apex case was
incorrectly decided. This is not my position, because I do not presume to
understand the policies being developed by the present Court. But I do
believe that the Apex case is absolutely inconsistent with the three boycott
cases-Loewe, Duplex and Bedford-and with the Second Coronado caseassuming that I am correct in my belief that proof in this last case of subjective intent to restrain competition in a national market became unnecessary when it appeared that the strikers were deliberately trying to
keep Coronado coal out of a national market for any purpose. The evidence was clear in the Apex case that the strikers refused to allow the
shipment of a million and a half pairs of stockings already packed for interstate commerce. If this was not just as much an interference with interstate commerce as anything that happened in the three boycott cases,
then practical reason, if any, has forsaken me. In other words, I am convinced that if the Apex case had arisen, say, eight or ten years ago, the
Supreme Court of that time would certainly have decided it differently.
Mr. Justice Hughes dissenting in the Apex case points out that the intent
in the Second Coronado case to control competition in a national market
was unnecessary to the decision in view of the new evidence that the strik24
ers were undertaking to keep Coronado coal out of interstate commerce.
24 Compare the remarks of the Chief Justice where he says, ".. .. whether the purpose was

to maintain unionization in other States, or within the same State, would not seem material."
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 524 (1940).
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He quoted from that case: "But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control
the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it
in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust
Act. '"25 Later he remarked: "This Court has never heretofore decided
that a direct and intentional obstruction or prevention of shipment of
goods in interstate commerce was not a violation of the Sherman Act."
And I believe that the Chief Justice's views are a far more accurate indication of what the Court would have decided a few years ago than are,
say, justice Stone's. For the Court was not then obsessed with this notion
of protecting "freedom of competition in a national market," and addressed itself to the protection of interstate commerce within the currently accepted meaning of that term. Furthermore, treating the interference in the Apex case as a violation of the act would not have had the
6
same results as so treating the interference in the Leather Workers' case.2
For the effectiveness of strikes can and should be made to depend only
upon the economic embarrassment caused by stoppage of production and
not upon the deliberate restraint of possible continued commercial relations with others.

V
By way of approaching a general consideration of what the Apex case
means and of what the Court's present and future position on labor under
the Sherman Act may be, it is necessary to consider some of the cases
under discussion from what may be called a "jurisdictional point of view"
before we consider the "real" general purpose of Congress in the Sherman
Act, according to the social philosophy of the present Court. Since the
decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.27 it is "dear" that
Congress has power under the commerce clause to legislate with reference to local strikes and other union activities which affect what is called
interstate commerce. In other words, Congress has power to regulate the
local employment affairs of any industry engaged in producing for national markets, so that labor troubles at such plants will not tend to affect
interstate commerce by holding up production and, hence, the fulfillment
of commercial relations. Now this is just a new phase of the same old
transportational concept of "commerce among the states" which the
2SIbid., quoting from 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925).
2"In the Leather Workers' case, the Court points out that the strikers "did nothing which
in any way interfered with the interstate transportation or sales of the complainants' products." 265 U.S. 457, 47r (1924).
2730I

U.S. i (1937).
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Court has always adhered to; and, although the sound is not quite so
dear, one with sharp ears can still hear the wheels clicking as they cross
interstate boundaries. But it is a phase which had no currency until 1937;
and we are therefore entitled to assume that Congress did not have it in
mind when the Sherman Act was passed. Hence it seems fair to assume
that the Court should not now use the Sherman Act to hold illegal any
labor union activities tending to affect interstate commerce in any way,
merely because such effect warrants the exercise of federal power if Congress wishes to prevent it. In other words, the profession should use great
care not to identify effects on commerce sufficient to justify federaljurisdiction with violations of the Sherman Act. For Congress intended the Sherman Act for one purpose and the Wagner ActeS for a far different one.
Congress designed the Sherman Act for the purpose of protecting interstate markets from restraints on free competition involving controls of
supply and price as well as discrimination as between would-be purchasers
and sellers. The Wagner Act was enacted for the purpose of protecting
interstate transportation (or commerce) from being held up by local
strikes and labor troubles directly traceable to the anti-union policies of
producers for national markets. Therefore it would be a perversion of the
Sherman Act to use it against a union striking for wages and hours or for
the dosed shop, merely because the Court has agreed with Congress in
connection with the Wagner Act that the interference with continued interstate commerce resulting from cessation of operations is harmful to the
national economy and can be corrected by federal legislation. Indeed, the
Wagner Act expressly provides that such strikes may still be called; but
its general purpose remains: by salutary pressure on recalcitrant employers to correct the conditions leading to a recurrence of such strikes.
This does not mean, however, if a complete picture of Congress' purpose
in the Sherman Act can be stated, that any union activity offending this
purpose should not therefore be declared unlawful, regardless of the presence or absence of conduct which bears a physical relationship to interstate
transportation. By parity of reasoning, unless the union activity in question does offend the agreed purpose of the Sherman Act, it should not be
declared illegal under that act no matter how obviously it interferes with
interstate transportation or commerce, if the latter word be preferred.
For instance, in the Brims case 9 the only union activity was a promise to
refuse to work for any building contractor using non-union made wood
trim. And in the Second Coronado case the only feature differentiating it
" 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i5i (Supp. i94o).
29 Note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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from the First Coronado and the Leather Workers' cases was proof that
the union activity was for the purpose of keeping the coal from competing
in a national market with union-mined coal. Thus on such ephemeral
items as a promise and an intent is the application of the Sherman Act
made to depend and not just upon physical interference with the movement of goods. At the same time it should be recognized that occurrences
such as those in the First Coronado and Leather Workers' cases are the
kinds of situations the Wagner Act is designed to prevent; yet that act
does not set up a sanction against the strike, but against the employers
whose anti-union inclinations lead labor to strike.
To return to the three boycott cases, I fear that lawyers who believe
that these obvious restraints on interstate commerce are dearly illegal
under the Sherman Act, while the obvious restraint on interstate commerce occurring in the Apex case is not, have fallen into the very pitfall
against which I have just issued a warning. They have, in brief, confused
the jurisdictional factor-the interference with commerce which perhaps
too vividly portrays the justification for federal intervention-with the
actual intervention which Congress intended to embark upon in the Sherman Act. This identification is natural and was practiced by the Court in
all three of the boycott cases. It is odd, therefore, that it did not perceive
the similarity between these cases and the prevention of shipment in the
Apex case. But perhaps even the Supreme Court was misled by the "vast
difference" between the effects of the boycotts on the one hand and of the
Apex "strike" or seizure on the other. Internal evidence indicating that
the Court was not altogether misled is the attempt to pass the three boycott cases off as instances of "substantial restraint ' ' 3° on the "general
market" for fur hats, printing presses and cut stone, although there is no
evidence of such restraints in the reports of those cases, and it is perfectly
clear that the Court in those cases depended upon no such notion in
reaching its decisions. Still, if the Court could establish this idea and could
thus distinguish the stoppages of commerce in the boycott cases from that
in the Apex case, it avoided having to decide for the plaintiff in the Apex
case because of analogous precedents.
But if this is a true picture of the Court's tactics, it has climbed out of
one hole only to enter another, unless it throws logic to the winds. First,
let me assume that the Court did not arrive at its conclusion in the Apex
case by rational deduction from precedents. It seems dear that the Court
reached its result on extra-judicial considerations of policy not found on
any printed page and not existing when the boycott cases were decided.
3oNote ii supra.
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In fact, a majority of the present Court feels far differently about labor
unions and their activities than did the incumbents of the Court prior to
and including the time of the Bedford decision, saving, of course, Holmes,
Brandeis and Stone himself.3' Everybody knows this, and it might as well
be taken into account as a factor in this argument. Having reached the
result in the Apex case, the Court had to agree upon some explanation of
this decision which would seem in accordance with established law, including its own precedents. Why, then, did the Court reaffiim the boycott cases so enthusiastically as still current law and at the same time introduce the seeming requirement of "substantial" restraint on the general
market for the commodities concerned, if it intends in the future to hold
labor boycotts of this general type to be violations of the Sherman Act?
For everyone knows that "substantial effect" on the general market does
not accompany these boycotts, at least in the mine-run of cases, and counsel for the labor unions are already so arguing in the lower federal courts
with tolerable success. Personally, I cannot tell whether by this device
the Court wanted to pay lip-service to the boycott cases as precedents
and at the same time practically get rid of them; or whether it intends in
the future to follow these precedents and to declare all similar boycotts to
be violations of the Sherman Act. If the former alternative is true, it is a
pity that the Court could not openly have overruled the boycott cases on
the ground that they were instances of organizational pressure essentially
no different from the prevention of shipment of already produced goods
in the Apex case and were, similarly, not attempts or conspiracies to affect
in any way the general market in the commodities concerned. Overruling
these precedents "in effect" by refusing in the future to recognize "substantial" restraints on the general market in boycott cases would be an
artificial recourse. judge Learned Hand's ironical bow to this notion of
"substantial effect" on the general market in a recent labor boycott case,
United States v. Gold,32 certainly justifies this prediction. And if the Court
occasionally does recognize "substantial" restraints, say, in a nation-wide
boycott against the General Motors products which, because of the size
of the producer, would undoubtedly be reflected in such market conditions as price and supply, the Court would be open to the accusation that
it was administering the Sherman Act only for the protection of large producers.
On the other hand, if the Court does follow the three boycott cases to
31 justice Stone concurred specially in the Bedford case in 1927; Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
32 1x5 F. (2d) 236 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
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the letter and forgets about this "substantial" restraint feature which is
not present in those cases, anyway, it will have abandoned logic and will
have exposed itself to the accusation of inconsistency until it overrules
the Apex case and re-defines just what it means when it says that the
Sherman Act was intended only to protect national markets, as such. Its
only "logical" way out of such an inconsistency with the Apex result is to
declare that there is a difference between strikers sitting on already produced goods to prevent shipment to consignees and strikers who refuse to
work for an employer if he purchases and offers to use goods from a specified producer in another state.
VI
Some years ago in his Bedford dissent, 33 Justice Brandeis expounded
an arresting notion concerning the application of the Sherman Act to the
tactics of organized labor. This point of view has now become extremely
important to understand, not only because Assistant Attorney-General
Arnold has gone out of his way to incorporate it as part of his policy
toward union activities, 34 but also because it has become a dominant
consideration in the political and social atmosphere of the times. Brandeis thought it a mistake to declare organizational boycotts to be violations of the Sherman Act merely because they involved restraints upon
the interstate commerce of a non-union producer and of his out-of-state
customers. I feel certain that his attitude was prompted by the same
considerations which have led the present Court in the Apex case to decide that the seizure of the Apex plant and the prevention of shipments
of hosiery did not constitute a violation of the act. With the support
of a few state supreme courts and many economists and lawyers,
Brandeis asserted that the labor secondary boycott is just as lawful as
the strike, whether it be used as a bargaining or as an organizational device. He pointed out that, like the strike, the boycott was merely an organized refusal to deal with another, except upon stated terms. A consumption boycott, such as that in the Loewe case, is a special type of refusal to deal, that is, a refusal to purchase. A labor boycott, such as that
in the Bedford case, is likewise a special type of refusal to deal, that is, a
refusal to work. Such boycotts are, on the whole, much more peaceful than
strikes and they are certainly more effective as an organizing device. Indeed, they are frequently the only practicable device for organizing some
33 274 U.S.

37, 56

(1927).

34 For a brief summary of this policy, see Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business c. m,
especially at 249-53 (1940).
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units of industry in situations where strikes or picket lines would be futile;
and they are peculiarly valuable for this very reason in organizing large
plants, the output of which is not bought locally. By declaring this organizational device to be unlawful under the Sherman Act, Brandeis
feared that the Supreme Court was virtually depriving the unions of the
right to press organization into new fields in much the same way as it
would have been depriving the unions of the right to strike for hours and
wages had it decided differently in the FirstCoronadoand Leather Workers'

cases.
It is noteworthy that Brandeis agreed with the balance of the Court in
the Second Coronado and the Brims cases. Perhaps a safe inference from
this fact is that he regarded the Sherman Act as a sanction devised to protect national markets from the imposition of competitive restraints on it
as such and that he regarded the interferences with interstate commerce
caused by the boycotts to be merely "incidental" and "indirect" in precisely the same sense that the majority of the Court so regarded the conceded restraints on interstate commerce occurring in the FirstCoronado
and Leather Workers' cases. As I said above, the only distinction between
the two type situations was that the boycotts were more obviously restraints; but the majority of the Court was misled by this obviousness into
confusing the kind of restraint that warranted federal jurisdiction to regulate with the character of restraint the Sherman Act was designed to prevent; whereas Brandeis keenly perceived that this was only a difference of
degree and not a real distinction at all. And the Retail Lumber Dealers'
case, 35 on which Stone depended so much in the Apex case, is distinguishable from the boycott cases because there the record showed that the association was attempting to control local markets as the "natural" monopolies of retailers and to exclude the competition of non-members.
A possible weakness with Brandeis' position as I have hypothetically
developed it is its exposure to a kind of dialectical transposition. It may
be said that in the Leather Workers' case the strike did cause an interference with interstate commerce but that, since strikes are an accepted form
of union activity, the otherwise illegal restraint must be accepted as an incident of justifiable conduct. This may appropriately be called the argument of "justification." The reason, then, why boycotts causing restraints
on interstate commerce are declared illegal under the act is that they are
not an accepted form of legitimate union activity and are, therefore, not
"justifiable." But this argument may not carry much weight in 194i because most of our liberal judges probably feel the way Brandeis does about
35Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo (x914).
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union organizational boycotts and they are likely to assume the position
that since each technique-the strike and the boycott-is a "justifiable"
organizing device, then each may be used with impunity as far as the
Sherman Act is concerned, unless, of course, its use precipitates a "substantial" restraint of the general market-which practically means an almost completely unrestricted scope for union organizational activities
against national industries. For it can be proved without much difficulty
that a federated union's interest in organizing a plant by boycotting its
products in other states is just as real as the interest of a group of employees, or of the same federated union, for that matter, seeking to organize the same plant by strike or seizure.. 6
VII
Mr. Arnold's statement of policy in proceeding against the activities of
labor unions is to some extent a shrewd forecast of the direction in which
the Court appears to be going. Unlike the Court, he is not bound to follow, to "distinguish" or to overrule any institutional precedents. Nor does
the Assistant Attorney-General have to worry about the kinds of cases
which private litigants may press under claims for injunctions or triple
damages. He may guess which way the wind, political or social, is blowing
and chart his course accordingly. It seems more than coincidence or whim
that he has adopted the views of Justice Brandeis as part of his policy.
Although he has never said as much, it looks as if he had surmised that the
administration, and perhaps the present Court, favors the view that the
organizational activities of labor unions should be immune from attack
unless it appears that such activities are aimed not so much at "legitimate" organizational activities as at control of commodities markets.
And if this analysis is correct, it looks as if the purpose and aim of union
36By now it is acknowledged by progressive courts that a union may follow a non-union-

made product into the hands of those who intend to use the commodity as a means of furthering their own enterprises. This proposition has reference not only to the "community of interest" existing among different branches of a federated union to further the making and using
of certain products with the assistance of union labor, but also has reference to the "unity of
interest" existing between a non-union producer and one who uses or sells the non-union
products in furtherance of the latter's own enterprise and to give him an advantage over his
competitors who purchase only union-made products. This "unity of interest," most graphically set forth in recent years by the New York Court of Appeals in Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N.Y. 281, 1i N.E. (2d) 910 (X937), is such as to render the enterpriser dealing in the non-

union product-at least for most practical purposes-just as "unfair" to organized labor as is
the non-union producer himself. For a further discussion of this point, see 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
356 (i941), noting People v. Muller, 174 Misc. 872, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 1oo3 (S. Ct. 1940).
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activities affecting interstate commerce may be the Court's focal point of
inquiry in its future administration of the Sherman Act in the labor field.
This does not imply, of course, that the Court may not ever treat labor
boycotts affecting interstate commerce as violations of the Sherman Act.
It merely signifies that the Court may not treat some labor union boycotts
as violations, namely, those concerned only with organization such as the
Loewe, Duplex and Bedford cases. It means by implication that the Court
will treat as violations of the Sherman Act other labor union boycotts having immediate effects on the market identical to the ones just mentioned,
and in addition, those designed to keep certain types of commodities permanently out of the market (not because they are non-union-made but
because they are innovations tending to upset vested union interests).
Since the aim of such boycotts is destruction of the market for products
beneficial to consumers, it will not be difficult to establish their illegality
under Justice Stone's "protection of the market" criterion.
But Mr. Arnold's program is more extensive than protection of the
market as such. He believes that by indictment he may prevent specific
union practices which he thinks harmful to national economy. However,
it is difficult to see how some of these practices-like jurisdictional disputes, whether between two craft unions 37 or between rival federated unions-can be said to affect national markets any more seriously than the
usual self-help coercive organizational tactics. Perhaps Mr. Arnold expects the Court to draw the distinction between "justifiable" and "unjustifiable" union practices adverted to above. Under this approach, conceding that all such practices do interfere with and restrain interstate
commerce, he might assume that the Court would declare unlawful those
union activities which even Justice Brandeis would hesitate to defend.
Such an assumption perhaps suggests the amusing spectacle of trying to
explain the "justification" for the lawless invasion of the Apex plant and
destruction of its property. But the drawback to such expectations is the
present Court's avowed policy to use the Sherman Act only for the protection of national markets, as such, whatever that might mean. To use
it as Mr. Arnold has hypothetically been made to suggest in this article
would be to abandon the "protection of market" criterion and to assume
the function of policing interstate commerce, a task which the Court in
the Apex case most emphatically said it would not undertake in the name
of the Sherman Act.
37 See particularly United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 6oo (Mo. I94o), probable jurisdiction noted, 31o U.S. 6og (194o); argued before the Supreme Court on December io, 194o.
9 U.S.L.Week 3154 (I94o).
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VIII

It is high time for us to determine, if possible, just what is the Court's
present policy toward the activities of labor unions under the Sherman
Act in the light of the Apex case. Justice Stone, in describing the scope of
the act, says: "The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free
competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services." 38 He repeatedly
stresses the purpose to maintain freedom of competition, remarking, variously, that "some form of restraint of commercial competition has been
the sine qua non to the condemnation of contracts, combinations or conspiracies" under the act and that the restraints prohibited were "only
those which are so substantial as to affect market prices .... or otherwise
to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive
from free competition." 39 In addition he makes it clear that the Supreme
Court has never applied the act "as a means of policing interstate transportation" and goes on in the same sentence to state the issue of the Apex
case to be "whether a conspiracy of strikers in a labor dispute to stop the
operation of the employers' factory in order to enforce their demands
against the employer" is the sort of thing at which the act is aimed "even
though ....

the only effect on trade or commerce was to prevent sub-

stantial shipments interstate by the employer"4°-a most dubious characterization of the evidence.
The present Court's concern for freedom of competition in national
markets is patent; but it is no more obvious than its lack of concern for
obstructions or interferences to interstate transportation in contradistinction to marketing. The vice of fictional terms like "freedom of competition" and "market" is that they have no precise meaning and may assume different significances in different contexts. But whatever it means
by "freedom of competition" in "national markets," it is perfectly clear
that in the Apex case the Court for the first time has taken the position
that the wholesale restriction of competition in national markets involved
in activities of a federated labor union has the unqualified approval of the
Government. This means that from now on the unions, by establishing the
universal closed shop in national industries, may use their collective-bargaining power to impose a fixed-wage system throughout each industry,
3'310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940).

39 Ibid., at Soo-i, citing, inter alia, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344, 360 (1933).
40 Ibid.,

at 487.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

thereby eliminating one of the most important competitive factors in modem industrial and commercial life. 4' The economic results of such aposition
may possibly be to discourage competition among existing units of production, freezing costs at a relatively high level and cutting down the
amount of goods produced because of the high labor costs. Another possible consequence is the relative unlikelihood of new enterprise as a means of
affording some sort of competition in national markets. The previous
statement is concededly hypothetical; yet that part of it dealing with the
union desire to stabilize wage conditions throughout national industries is
certainly true. This desire, as every student of labor problems is aware,
has become a necessity, since labor unionism as a device for securing advantages to its members cannot stand non-union or free competition and
continue to exist. And it is equally clear that, broadly speaking, unionized
producers cannot stand the competition of non-union producers and continue to remain solvent, unless they break with the unions. Now from
this we may infer that federated unionism and its drive to eliminate the
competition of non-union products from national markets has a great deal
to do with control of prices; and if output declines with rising costs, supply
in national markets is likely to suffer. Yet the Supreme Court, while expounding the Sherman Act as the bulwark of free competition in national
markets, frankly concedes that the unions may carry out their anti-competition economic program to the full. The legal profession is, therefore,
naturally puzzled over the meaning of justice Stone's language concerning
market protection in the Apex case.
How the Court happened to arrive at a position so far removed from
that set forth by Chief justice Taft in the FirstCoronado case is hard to
say. The passage of years, with general changes of economic and social
thought, together with the greatly increased political power of organized
labor and with genuinely different judicial conceptions of the originally
intended application of the Sherman Act to labor unions, have no doubt
had something to do with it. But the Court's formal method of embracing
this position leads one to suspect that Section 6 of the Clayton Act is not
as dead as it was thought to have been after the Duplex case. justice
Stone acknowledged this new position in the Apex case with the following
sentences (shortly after having quoted Section 6 of the Clayton Act):
"Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate
41 This is not meant to imply, of course, that the Supreme Court would formerly have regarded such a union agreement as unlawful under the Sherman Act unless, perhaps, the circumstances were similar to those which the Court in the Coronado case said would lead to a

violation of the act.
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the competition from non-union made goods, .... an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any
national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been
considered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited
by the Sherman Act."' It seems likely that the Court defines labor unions as organizations, the normal objectives of which are to do whatever
is necessary for their economic survival, and then reasons that Congress,
having accepted labor unions in Section 6 of the Clayton Act, has also accepted the inseparable attributes of the unions as part of them. Chief
Justice Taft's court certainly did not do so; but in his time it is clear that
the federal courts did not look upon unions as organizations whose legitimate function was to restrain competition in any way.
Justice Stone did drop a footnote 43 indicating that Congress in the
Wagner Act had apparently approved the universal dosed union shop
throughout national industries and hence had by implication approved
the elimination of non-union competition which is one of the primary objectives of universal organization. And it is hard to deny the force of this
implication if, indeed, it be dear that Congress had envisaged universal
dosed shop organizations under the act. Certainly Congress must have
realized that the then existing national federated unions would press for
recognition under the act and would try to use it for extending organization. But it is dear in the Wagner Act that Congress also intended to
leave all questions of organization ultimately up to the employees in particular bargaining units of industry. In view of the allowances made in
the act for independent plant unionism or for rejecting unionism altogether it is, therefore, far from certain that Congress either wanted or even
contemplated the possibility of the universal dosed shop, much less the
incidental elimination of all non-union competition in national markets.
Anyhow, there seems to be sufficient doubt about this to make assumption
by the Court of this view by implication a questionable step. In any
event, the availability to unions of parliamentary organizational methods
under the Wagner Act, which might with effective administration result
in a certain amount of healthful independent plant unionism, or even nonunionism, should perhaps have kept the Court from so openly encouraging
the established federated unions to achieve dosed national union commodities markets by coercive self-help methods.
423T- U.S. 469, 503-4 (194o), citing, inter alia, American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921), and Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
289 U.S. io3 (1933).
' 33o U.S. 469, 504 n. 24 (1940)-
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IX

This leads us naturally to a final reconsideration of the secondary boycott technique-unionism's most effective peaceful organizing device. In
the light of preceding discussion, serious doubts concerning the legality
under the Sherman Act of boycotts interfering with interstate sales and
shipments of goods as a means of creating organizational pressure seem
unlikely. Attacking purely organizational boycotts under the Sherman
Act seems futile if success depends upon protecting free competition in
national markets in accordance with the present Court's ideas of such
market protection. Nevertheless, the Court may yet be able to steer a
course between the wholesale union restraint of a competitive commodities
market by universal federated unionism and particular restraints affecting
specific producers and their customers.
The federated unions, of course, can hardly be expected to admit this.
Both the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations have condemned Mr. Arnold's policy, although he has not
prosecuted even union boycotts which disrupt interstate commerce and
free access to markets as long as their ultimate objective is organization.
This position of the federated unions seems unreasonable, for they could
hardly expect Mr. Arnold to adopt a more extreme position than even
justice Brandeis has taken. But they have interpreted Mr. Arnold's recognition of Justice Brandeis' view as proof that the mere physical "restraining effect" of boycotts is not unlawful under the Sherman Act. They
have openly accused 44 Mr. Arnold of using the Sherman Act to prevent organized labor's use of coercive tactics to achieve ends which he believes to
be "bad," such as preventing the sale and use of new materials and equipment or compelling employers to hire unnecessary men or achieving the
advantages sought in jurisdictional disputes. Since in his prosecutions of
these cases he relies on much the same types of restraints on commerce as
occur in the situations he refuses to indict, they point out that by such
refusal he tacitly concedes that no offense exists in any of these situations
under the act. What he is doing, they claim, is perverting the Sherman
Act to stop what he believes to be socially bad conduct, a purpose for
which the act was never designed. Their reasoning is simple: if a restraint on commerce is unlawful under the Sherman Act, it is unlawful
44Such a charge was heard by the writer while listening to the argument of Mr. Charles H.
Tuttle, counsel for the carpenters' union, in an anti-trust suit brought against an AFL union
for refusing to handle a product produced by a CIO union. United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, argued before judge Woodward in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in November, I94O.
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aside from the objective sought by the restraint; and if the restraint having certain effects on commerce is not unlawful in view of one set of objectives, then it is not unlawful in view of any objective. To decide otherwise,
they conclude, is to make the Sherman Act a mere policing measure.
This apparent confusion on the part of union lawyers between effects
such as give the Federal Government jurisdiction to act and the character of effects such as render the restraints illegal under the Sherman Act
is, perhaps, excusable; for the chances are that the bulk of the bar has
identified the two in interpreting the statute and finds it far from easy to
answer the conundrum: when is a restraint not a restraint. And if the
Court ever decides that labor boycotts used as they were in the Loewe,
Duplex, and Bedford cases are illegal restraints under the Sherman Act,
the union lawyers are with some justice going to wonder just what it is
that differentiates such restraints from that in the Apex case.
Even if the Court does not overrule the Apex case, it may still narrow
its construction of market protection as the criterion for applying the
Sherman Act to labor. Thin as it may be, there is a distinction between
prevention of commerce by seizure or strike at the producer's plant, such
as the refusal to allow shipment of the Apex stockings, and prevention of
commerce by boycott pressure brought directly either on the producer's
customers as coercion on the producer or brought directly on the producer
as coercion on the producer's customers. In each situation producers and
customers are affected in their commercial relations. But in the former
this effect appearsto be exercised only on transportation, and in the latter
it is obviously exercised on sales as such, transactions more patently typical of commercial relations and the market than is mere transportation.
The Court may say that while it would not use the act to "police" interferences with transportation, it will use it to protect "market" transactions from attempts to control supply and to restrain "free competition."
And those who acknowledge trade unionism as a legitimate enterprise for
gain but who still want to see curbed its practices which disrupt the free
buying and selling in an unrestricted interstate market, should be satisfied.

45

45 justice Black's opinion in the recent Lake Valley case (AMik Wagon Drivers' Union v.
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 61 S. Ct. 122 (i94o)) has been regarded by some as a hopeful indication that the Supreme Court still intends to use the Sherman Act as a means of
controlling the activities of labor in appropriate circumstances. It was made clear in that case
that the Court was only denying injunctive relief in accordance with the plain wording of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and its broad definition of "labor dispute," and was not passing on the
merits of the suit as a violation of the Sherman Act.

